Journal of Financial Crises
Volume 4

Issue 2

2022

Canada: Bankers’ Acceptance Purchase Facility
Corey N. Runkel
Yale School of Management

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons,
Macroeconomics Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Policy History, Theory,
and Methods Commons, and the Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Runkel, Corey N. (2022) "Canada: Bankers’ Acceptance Purchase Facility," Journal of Financial Crises: Vol.
4 : Iss. 2, 1442-1459.
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol4/iss2/66

This Case Study is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact
journalfinancialcrises@yale.edu.

Canada: Bankers’ Acceptance Purchase Facility1
Corey N. Runkel2
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
July 15, 2022
Abstract
Bankers’ acceptances (BAs) are a form of investment security guaranteed by banks to fund
loans to businesses against their credit lines. In Canada, BAs underpin the Canadian Dollar
Offered Rate (CDOR), the main benchmark used to calculate floating interest rates in
Canada’s derivatives market. In 2018, BAs formed the largest segment of money market
securities traded in the secondary market at around CAD 35 billion (USD 26 billion) per
week. When asset managers and the country’s public pension providers began shedding BAs
amid the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, CDOR spiked, and the effects threatened to
ripple throughout the Canadian financial system. On March 13, 2020, the Bank of Canada
(BoC) established the Bankers’ Acceptance Purchase Facility (BAPF). The BAPF conducted
multi-rate reverse auctions with Canadian primary dealers for highly rated BAs of remaining
maturities up to 76 days. In its first two operations, dealers sold the BoC the total offered
amounts of CAD 15 billion and CAD 20 billion, and the BA market stabilized. The BoC bought
another CAD 12 billion of BAs in four operations in April. It continued to offer to buy
CAD 10 billion in weekly, then biweekly reverse auctions until October, with no further bids
from banks.
Keywords: banker’s acceptance, BAPF, BAs, Canada, CDOR, COVID-19 pandemic, market
liquidity

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering market support programs in response to COVID-19. Cases are available from the Journal
of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
2 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
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Overview
A banker’s acceptance (BA) is a short-term
(generally one-month) funding tool for
corporate borrowers that provides a “direct
and unconditional order” from the borrower
to draw down against its established line of
credit (McRae and Auger 2018, 1). The bank
offering the line of credit also guarantees the
BA, providing funding for small and mediumsized corporate borrowers that may not
otherwise have access to the primary
funding market due to their size or credit
ratings. BAs sold in the secondary market are
often purchased by institutional investors
because they are very liquid and carry an
attractive yield over similarly rated
Government of Canada bonds (Vikstedt and
McRae 2020, 6). In 2018, BAs accounted for
the largest share of outstanding Canadian
money market instruments issued by
nongovernment entities (McRae and Auger
2018, 13).

Key Terms
Purpose: “to support the continuous functioning of
financial markets . . . and a key source of financing
for small- and medium-size corporate borrowers”
(BoC 2020h)
Launch Dates

Announced: March 13,
2020

Operational Date

March 23, 2020

End Date

October 26, 2020

Legal Authority

Bank of Canada Act,
articles 18(g)(i) and
18.1(1)

Source(s) of Funding

Bank of Canada balance
sheet

Administrators

Bank of Canada

Overall Size

No fixed ceiling

Canadian BAs with
When COVID-19 began to spread globally in Purchased Assets
remaining maturities of
early March 2020, investors’ daily sales of
up to 76 business days
BAs to bank dealers essentially quadrupled
rated at least R-1 (low)
from CAD 500 million to CAD 2 billion (USD
373 million to USD 1.5 billion)3 (Fontaine et Peak Utilization
CAD 38.8 billion on
al. 2021, 11). Bank dealers lowered their
April 8
prices as the demand for BAs fell. On March
13, the Bank of Canada (BoC) announced it would purchase high-quality, one-month BAs in
the secondary market to support the “continuous functioning” of financial markets (BoC
2020h). The Bankers’ Acceptance Purchase Facility (BAPF) conducted multi-rate reverse
auctions with primary dealers, which originated almost all BAs.

On March 23, the BAPF conducted its first auction. The BoC purchased 45 BAs worth CAD 15
billion—the full amount offered—at yields between 1.11% and 1.65%. Its next auction, for
CAD 20 billion on March 30, also resulted in full usage. Participation waned over the next four
auctions, with utilization falling to zero by May 2020. The BoC reduced the frequency of
auctions to biweekly in July and discontinued the BAPF on October 26, 2020. In all, the BoC
purchased CAD 47 billion. The BAPF was small in comparison to the BoC’s repurchase
agreements and purchases of government bonds and bills during the pandemic crisis, as

3

USD 1 = CAD 1.34 during March 2020.
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shown in Figure 3. But the facility had a much larger impact because of the role of the BA
market in determining the Canadian Dollar Offered Rate (CDOR). The CDOR was the main
benchmark used to set floating interest rates in the Canadian derivatives market. The CDOR
administrator sets the CDOR daily from a survey of banks on the rate at which they provided
firms credit through BAs and transacted in secondary-market BAs. Figure 1 shows the comovement of the spreads of the secondary-market BA rate and the CDOR lending rate to
overnight index swaps (OIS) before and during the BAPF.
Summary Evaluation
The BA-OIS spread widened significantly in early March but settled near its pre-crisis level
after the first several BAPF auctions (see Figure 1). Fontaine et al. (2021, 23) write that, “By
early May, BA rates fell below the Bank’s reserve rate, indicating that the BA market had
recovered sufficiently to be ineligible for central bank support.” However, no literature has
attempted to isolate or estimate the effect of the BAPF’s purchases on the market or their
effect on lending to businesses, the facility’s other stated purpose. A BoC working paper, the
fullest treatment of the facility, estimates how the announcement of the BAPF on March 13
affected the BA market even before its first purchase. It finds that the announcement reduced
BA yields in the secondary market by 15 basis points (bps). When additional details were
announced between March 13 and 23, 2020, BA yields further decreased by 20 bps to 70 bps
relative to bank-sponsored asset-backed commercial paper and senior deposit notes, asset
classes that share many features with BAs (Arora et al. 2020). A BoC report also asserts that
the central bank’s policies “likely helped alleviate scarcity in money markets and restore
trading conditions in broader bond markets” (Fontaine et al. 2021, 22). It notes that the way
the BoC used asset purchases to improve bank lending could be an indicator of future
directions for monetary policy.
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Figure 1: Daily Interbank Funding Spreads and BAPF Auctions

Sources: BoC 2020a; BoC 2020h; “Canadian Dollar Security 1M” 2019–2021; IIROC 2019–2021; Renfinitiv 2019–
2021.
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Context: Canada 2019–2020

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

$1,778.4 billion in 2019
$1,777.1 billion in 2020
$46,327 in 2019
$43,258 in 2020
Data for 2019:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

Data for 2020:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AA+
Data not available for 2019
Data not available for 2020
Data not available for 2019
Data not available for 2020
Data not available for 2019
Data not available for 2020
84.2% in 2019
84.5% in 2020
Data not available for 2019
Data not available for 2020
Data not available for 2019
Data not available for 2020
Yes, in 2019
Yes, in 2020

Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The BAPF aimed to stabilize a core funding market and support lending
to nonfinancial businesses.
The close link between corporate borrowing and derivatives forged by the Canadian Dollar
Offered Rate explained why the BoC cited both “the continuous functioning of financial
markets” and “financing for small- and medium-size corporate borrowers” in its
announcement of the BAPF (BoC 2020h).
The BA market is one of Canada’s “core funding markets” (BoC 2020h). A BA is “a direct and
unconditional order from a corporate borrower to draw down against its established line of
credit” (Vikstedt and McRae 2020, 3). After a bank lends funds to a borrower, the bank can
sell the BA liability on the secondary market; it represents a liability of the borrower but
carries the bank’s guarantee. Since BAs stopped carrying issuer names in the 1990s, BAs
carried the rating of the guaranteeing bank. In 2017, seven primary dealers4 issued 98% of
the BA market (McRae and Auger 2018).
Because they are almost always issued by a primary dealer, most BAs are highly rated. The
market is also highly liquid; as of March 11, 2020, 91% of the average daily BA trading
volume since 2015 carried one-month maturities, with another 8% carrying two- to threemonth tenors. Since they still “offer[ed] a relatively attractive yield pickup in the secondary
market over [Government of Canada] and provincial treasury bills,” BAs became a favorite
of institutional investors, who would purchase new BAs once those it held reached maturity
(Vikstedt and McRae 2020, 6). After competing with commercial paper for several decades,
BAs became the largest privately issued money market instrument after the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC) and accounted for more than 25% of Canada’s money market in 2017, only
slightly less than GoC bills (McRae and Auger 2018, 13).
Institutional investors began dumping BAs in March 2020 to weather a storm of outflows
related to the pandemic. Canada’s public pension companies, which usually bought
CAD 4 billion a week in BAs, became net sellers during the week of March 8, as seen in Figure
2. Meanwhile, businesses drew heavily on their lines of credit. The crisis deterred some
larger borrowers from commercial paper, while smaller borrowers drew on lines to fund
near-term liabilities (Arora et al. 2020). Each of these factors pushed yields higher.
This credit crunch spilled over to the CDOR, at which banks were “willing to lend their
balance sheet to corporate borrowers with existing BA facilities” (Vikstedt and McRae 2020,
9–10). This committed lending rate applied directly to the CAD 90 billion BA market, but—
like the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)—also underpinned a much larger market of

The seven dealers were: Bank of Montreal (BMO), Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS), Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce (CIBC), Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), National Bank of Canada (NBC), Royal
Bank of Canada (RBC), and Toronto-Dominion (TD) Bank (McRae and Auger 2018, 15).
4
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derivatives. When the spread of CDOR above the overnight index swaps rate climbed 100
bps above its pre-crisis level near 25 bps, it also threatened some CAD 11 trillion in over-thecounter and exchange-traded derivatives that used CDOR (Bédard-Pagé et al. 2021, 12;
McRae and Auger 2018, ii; Vikstedt and McRae 2020, 9–10). BoC staff also referenced the
importance of the CDOR in the BoC’s decision to create the BAPF. Of the four papers that
evaluate the BAPF, all consider the facility’s effect on CDOR, and none estimate its effect on
corporate borrowers.
Figure 2: Net Weekly BA Purchases by Large Pension Funds

Source: Bédard-Pagé et al. 2021, 8.

2. Part of a Package: The Government of Canada packaged the BAPF with other
business-credit programs.
The Government of Canada also discussed the BAPF as business credit and liquidity support
in its Economic Response Plan (Department of Finance 2020). The BoC announced the BAPF
on the same day it lowered its overnight rate from 1.25% to 0.75% and a day after it had
expanded purchases of government debt (BoC 2020f; BoC 2020g).
3. Legal Authority: The BoC issued a policy under the Bank of Canada Act that
allowed it to purchase BAs outright.
Section 18 of the Bank of Canada Act (1985) afforded the BoC broad powers in the service of
monetary policy and financial stability. Subsection 18(g)(i) allowed the BoC to trade in
virtually any security except equities but mandated that the BoC publish a policy in the legal
gazette describing the securities and transactions it would undertake.
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From 2015 to 2020, the BoC’s policy allowed it to acquire BAs but only by reverse repurchase
agreements (BoC 2015).5 On March 18, 2020, the BoC amended the 2015 policy, permitting
it to also purchase securities—such as BAs—outright. The amendment allowed such
purchases to address financial system stress or monetary policy in support of market
functioning.
The BoC clarified that such purchases—known as exceptional transactions—followed the
BoC’s authority under 18(g)(i) and were “distinct from” its 18(g)(ii) authority (BoC 2020e).
Subsection 18(g)(ii), which has never been invoked, allowed the BoC to purchase securities,
including equities, “if the Governor is of the opinion that there is a severe and unusual stress
on a financial market or the financial system” (Bank of Canada Act 1985). These powers
augmented the BoC’s explicit authority to purchase securities issued or guaranteed by
Canada, its provinces, the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, or European Union
member states.
The BoC lobbied for the creation of subsection 18(g)(i) during the Global Financial Crisis.
During parliamentary committee hearings, officials from the BoC and Ministry of Finance
argued that, when the GFC began, “some of the central banks had more room to move than
did” the BoC (Rudin, McKay, and Flaherty 2008). They noted the securities that the Bank of
Canada Act explicitly allowed the BoC to purchase—bills of exchange (such as BAs) and
promissory notes, in addition to government securities—and that:
The relevance of a number of those securities to the financial markets has decreased
over time because of financial innovation . . . for example, we cannot buy, for the
purposes of resale, money market securities longer than 180 days. We cannot buy
corporate bonds. There is a host. We cannot buy term asset-backed securities. We cannot
buy municipal bonds, or we cannot buy corporate commercial paper (Carney and McKay
2008, 6).
Motivated by the legislative constraints, the amendment that created 18(g)(i) used the Bank
of England and European Central Bank as models of central banks with broad authorities.
When the BoC published its first policy in the Canada Gazette describing the securities it
would purchase, its exceptional transactions were limited to repurchase agreements for
terms of up to 180 days.
4. Governance: The BoC was required to publish its 18(g)(i) policy before it came
into force.
The Bank of Canada Act required the BoC to publish its policy allowing outright transactions
in the Canada Gazette. The central bank was then required to wait seven days before enacting
its policy.

5

In Canada, these repos are known as purchase and resale agreements (PRAs).

1449

Canada

Runkel

The Bank of Canada Act (1985, vol. c. B-2, sec. 28) also enabled the minister of finance to
appoint auditors of the BoC and to require that those auditors report on bank affairs to the
minister “from time to time.”
5. Administration: Although the BoC administered the BAPF, it is not clear how it
organized its staff to implement the facility.
BoC notices listed two directors in the Treasury auctions and settlement systems team of the
Financial Markets Department as key contacts. This indicates that the BAPF used the familiar
infrastructure of Treasury auctions to communicate with primary dealers. Other documents
do not address further how the BoC implemented the BAPF.
Successful bidders delivered BAs through the CDSX platform, owned and operated by
Clearing and Depository Services (CDS) (BoC 2021b; BoC 2020d). Settlement occurred two
days later.
6. Communication: The BoC announced the BAPF by press release.
The BoC announced the BAPF on March 13, 2020, via market notice and released the facility’s
terms and conditions on its website (BoC 2020h). Newspaper archives revealed few
acknowledgements of—and no commentary on—the announcement. Nonetheless, BoC
researchers estimate that the announcement reduced the BA-OIS spread by 15 bps (Arora et
al. 2020). The BoC then released further operational details on the facility via notices on
March 17 and 19. The BoC appeared to have increased the amount on offer from CAD 10
billion to CAD 15 billion in the second of these notices (BoC 2020b; BoC 2020c). The same
BoC researchers find an additional 20–70-bp decrease in the BA-OIS spread following the
announcement of these details (Arora et al. 2020).
After the first operation, Smith (2020) reports “that there is some way to go before stress is
reduced in Canadian money markets.” The article offers what may be the only commentary
on the BAPF in a major news outlet.6
7. Disclosure: The BoC published transaction-level data and the BAPF’s aggregate
purchases.
In weekly financial statements, the BAPF appeared as “Bankers’ Acceptances,” a new line on
the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet, shown in Figure 3 along other BoC assets
(BoC 1981–2021). The BoC ultimately published transaction-level data for the BAPF,
detailing each bond it made eligible for purchase, their amounts, and their price (BoC 2021a).

6

Analysts such as those at TD Securities offered more commentary, but efforts to locate those articles failed.
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Figure 3: BAPF Compared to Other Canadian Market Liquidity Programs

Note: All other assets included provincial treasury bills and bonds, corporate bonds, and commercial paper.
Source: BoC 2020k, 25.

8. Use of SPV: The BAPF did not use an SPV.
The BoC did not use a special-purpose vehicle to administer the BAPF.
9. Size: The BoC offered to buy CAD 15 billion to CAD 20 billion in the first three
auctions, and CAD 10 billion in each auction thereafter.
The announcement of the BAPF did not specify its total size (BoC 2020h). A later notice
announced that the BoC would purchase up to CAD 15 billion in BAs and target CAD 10 billion
for most auctions (BoC 2020c). Over 24 auctions, the BoC ultimately purchased just more
than CAD 47 billion. After the first three operations, the BoC offered to buy CAD 10 billion of
BAs in each auction. The BoC offered to purchase CAD 15 billion, CAD 20 billion, and CAD 20
billion in the first three auctions, respectively, and then CAD 10 billion for the remaining
auctions (BoC 2020a). Documents do not suggest how the BoC determined how much it
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would purchase. As Tucker (2009, 11) notes, a market liquidity program should be “catalytic,
helping ideally to kick-start the market rather than replace it.” The question is important and
more difficult to answer than it is in auctions for central bank money, where the imbalance
in reserves is precisely known.
10. Source(s) of Funding: The Bank of Canada funded purchases by expanding its
balance sheet.
To fund the BAPF, the BoC credited primary dealers’ accounts with reserves held at the BoC.
11. Eligible Institutions: Primary dealers in government bonds participated in BAPF
auctions.
The BoC allowed the 11 Canadian primary dealers7 to participate in the BAPF (BoC 2020d).
It did not disclose which dealers participated in auctions.
12. Auction or Standing Facility: The BAPF conducted reverse multi-rate auctions.
Ahead of each operation, the BoC announced the date, purchase amount, minimum bid rate,
settlement date, and maturity range of eligible securities. Between 8:30 and 9:00 on the
morning of the operation, participants submitted up to 10 bids. Each identified the security
to be sold and its short-term credit rating, the yield a bidder was willing to pay, and the
amount a bidder would sell in CAD 5 million increments. The BoC then accepted bids starting
with the highest yield rates until the accepted bids exhausted the total amount offered.
Successful bidders received the rate they offered (BoC 2020d). Results of the subscribed
auctions are shown in Figure 4.
No participant could sell the BoC more than either 12.5% or 25% of a single auction’s offering
amount, depending on the dealer’s market share of government bonds. Participants could
bid the maximum amount each auction. The BoC did not publish a rationale behind this rule.
Because the BoC did not disclose which banks sold which securities, these maximum
amounts cannot be imputed.

These were Bank of Montreal (BMO) Nesbitt Burns, Casgrain & Company, CIBC World Markets, Desjardins
Securities, HSBC Securities, Laurentian Bank Securities, Merrill Lynch, NBC Financial, RBC Dominion Securities,
Scotia Capital (subsidiary of Bank of Nova Scotia [BNS or Scotiabank]), and TD Bank.
7
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Figure 4: Operation Results of BAPF Auctions
Settlement
date
3/25/2020
4/1/2020
4/8/2020
4/15/2020

Maturity
start date
3/26/2020
4/2/2020
4/9/2020
4/16/2020

Maturity
end date
5/4/2020
7/21/2020
7/28/2020
8/4/2020

Amount
offered
$15 billion
$20 billion
$20 billion
$10 billion

Purchased
$15 billion
$20 billion
$5.57 billion
$2.66 billion

Minimum
bid yield
0.63%
0.43%
0.4%
0.37%

Average
yield
1.57%
1.15%
0.52%
0.39%

4/22/2020
4/29/2020

4/23/2020
4/30/2020

8/11/2020
8/18/2020

$10 billion
$10 billion

$190 million
$3.63 billion

0.4%
0.4%

0.4%
0.4%

Source: BoC 2020a.

13. Loan or Purchase: The Bank of Canada purchased BAs outright from dealers.
The BoC had been accustomed to purchasing securities with the intention of reselling them
later. No documents indicate that the BoC attempted to make a market in BAs by later selling
them. The BAPF was one of the BoC’s first forays into outright purchases of private securities.
14. Eligible Assets: The BAPF purchased Canadian BAs rated at least R-1 (low) with
remaining maturities of up to 76 business days.
The BAPF purchased BAs issued by Canadian banks and branches of foreign banks in
Canadian dollars. Though it allowed remaining maturities up to 76 Canadian business days,
the BoC set an exact maturity range before each operation. This range encompassed most
BAs; 98% of BAs carried one- to three-month maturities (Vikstedt and McRae 2020, 4).
Eligible BAs carried credit ratings of at least R-1 (low) from DBRS Morningstar, representing
“good credit quality” (BoC 2020d).
Issuers could be any Canadian bank—including the bidder—but those from banks without
access to the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) must have been prescreened a day prior
to auction (BoC 2020d). The LVTS was a real-time gross settlement platform used by large
Canadian banks. To facilitate real-time transactions, the BoC granted participants intraday
credit secured by collateral pledged to the BoC through CDSX; the BoC was accustomed to
reviewing collateral from these banks in a short period of time (Engert, Gravelle, and Howard
2008, 5). The BAPF ultimately purchased securities issued by 10 institutions, nine of which
were affiliates of primary dealers (BoC 2021a).
15. Purchase Price: Bids required a minimum yield over overnight index swaps.
Banks offered a minimum yield called a reserve rate that was expressed as a spread over OIS
(BoC 2020d). This rate started at 0.60% and fell to below 0.40% before the BoC increased it
for the final two auctions in which banks participated (BoC 2021a). As seen in Figure 5, some
successful bidders accepted more than double the reserve rate in the first two auctions. In
later auctions, yields settled at the minimum rate, with a much narrower range of yields bid.

1453

Canada

Runkel

Figure 5: Purchased Securities; Minimum Bid Rate Indicated by Dashed Line

Source: BoC 2021a.

16. Haircuts: The BAPF had no haircuts.
As an asset purchase program, the BAPF did not have haircuts.
17. Interest Rates: The BAPF purchased securities based on the auction results.
The BAPF paid prices resulting from its reverse auction.
18. Fees: The BoC did not charge any fees.
No documents suggest that the BoC charged fees to issuers of securities that it purchased.
19. Term/Repayment: Assets matured at their scheduled coupon dates.
The BAPF did not amend the scheduled maturities of assets it purchased.
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20. Other Restrictions on Eligible Participants: The BOC did not add restrictions to
eligible participants.
Documents do not indicate other conditions beyond those discussed elsewhere in this case
study.
21. Regulatory Relief: Participants received no regulatory relief when participating in
the BAPF.
No documents suggest that banks received relief from capital or liquidity regulations as a
result of participating in the BAPF.
22. International Coordination: The BoC did not coordinate with other countries for
the BAPF.
The Canadian BA market was not mirrored abroad, and programs similar to the BAPF were
not implemented in other countries.
23. Duration: The BoC purchased its last BAs on April 27, 2020, but auctions continued
until October 26, 2020.
The BoC purchased its last BAs in the sixth auction, conducted on April 27, 2020. The BoC
continued to offer weekly BAPF auctions until July 6, when it reduced the frequency of BAPF
auctions from every week to every other week. The BoC cited “substantial improvements in
short-term funding conditions recently, as well as reduced participation” when making this
change (BoC 2020i).
After 17 operations without participation, the BoC announced on October 15, 2020 that it
would retire the BAPF amid continuing improvement of financial conditions, and the
declining usage in crisis facilities (BoC 2020a; BoC 2020j). Its last operation—also not
used—occurred on October 26, 2020.
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